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Statutory and Non-Statutory Responses to the

Director and Officer Liability Insurance Crisis
INTRODUCTION

Directors and officers constitute an integral part of corporate governance.
Although compensation for a director is not excessively high,' both directors
and officers may be the subjects of lawsuits in which plaintiffs seek high
stakes for alleged breaches of corporate duties. To mitigate this financial
disincentive to corporate service, corporations rely on two methods, indemnification and insurance, to insulate directors and officers from the financial
impact that results from personal liability incurred while acting in a corporate
capacity. 2 Today, however, a crisis has arisen, and director and officer
liability insurance may be inadequate or even unavailable. Recognizing the
potential dangers of this situation, many states and commentators have
proposed measures to protect directors and officers.
States are an appropriate body to propose protective measures because
corporations are creatures of state law. States regulate the conduct of directors and officers and impose liability on those who fail to meet these
standards. At the same time, state statutes determine the circumstances under
which a corporation may indemnify its directors and officers for expenses
incurred in litigation.3 In accordance with state law guidelines, corporate
bylaws may include indemnification clauses in which the corporation declares
that it will or might reimburse a director or officer for expenses associated
with defending a lawsuit. State laws also authorize corporations to purchase
director and officer (D&O) insurance policies. These policies serve a dual
function. The company reimbursement portion of these policies eases the
financial burden on the corporation when it indemnifies, while the director
and officer reimbursement portion protects directors and officers by pro-4
viding for direct reimbursement when a corporation falls to indemnify.
Together, indemnification and insurance reassure a director or officer that

1. The average board member of an industrial corporation was paid $24,624 for corporate
services in 1985. The average board member of a financial organization was paid only $21,290

in 1985. Barker, Director Compensation: Board Fees and Benefits 1986, 10 DICTORS AND
BoAnRs, Spring 1986, at 37.
2. In addition to the protection secured by insurance and indemnification, directors and
officers are protected by the judicial application of the business judgment rule. Note, Indemnification of Corporate Directors: A Disincentive to CorporateAccountability in Indiana, 17
VAL. U.L. REv. 229, 230 (1983).
3. Block, Advising Directors on the D&O Insurance Crisis, 14 SEc. RGo. L.J. 130, 133

(1986).
4. Id. at 132-33.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:181

if her conduct falls within a designated standard of conduct deemed to be

insurable or indemnifiable, her personal assets will not be jeopardized by
personal liability incurred in her corporate capacity.

Insurance, however, may no longer be an available source of protection
because insurance policies are becoming ever-increasingly more difficult' and

more expensive to obtain.6 As insurance protection declines, directors and
officers are more vulnerable to the economic hardships which personal liability imposes because they are being sued more often and are being held

liable for increasingly higher judgments. 7 As a result, some directors are
resigning from their corporate posts.' Furthermore, corporations now claim
it is more difficult to recruit for those positions. 9

This combination of shrinking insurance coverage and increasing liability
exposure has resulted in a D&O insurance crisis. The cause of the crisis is
disputed.' 0 But whatever the cause of the crisis, its effects are threatening
incumbent directors and officers as well as the traditional system of corporate
governance. Those who have responded to the crisis have proposed both
protective and corrective proposals. The protective measures are aimed at

mitigating the financial impact of personal liability, while the corrective
measures are aimed at restoring stability to the insurance market.
This Note examines both the statutory and the non-statutory responses to
the crisis. The purpose of this Note is to determine which of these proposals
will be desirable in terms of policy interests and which will be successful in

5. Lewin, Director InsuranceDrying Up, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1986, at DI, col. 3; Hilder,
Liability Insurance Is Difficult to Find Now for Directors, Officers, Wall St. J., July 10, 1985,
at 1, col. 6.
6. Prices have skyrocketed by 500 to 1000 percent for the typical D&O policy. Foley, The
First Line of DirectorDefense, 10 DmCTORS AND BoARDs, Spring 1986, at 16. In addition,
insurers have increased premiums. See Olson, The D&O Insurance Gap: Strategiesfor Coping,
Legal Times, Mar. 3, 1986, at 25, col. 1; Block, supra note 3, at 130-31; Galante, The D&O
Crisis: CorporateBoardroom Woes Grow, 8 Nat'l L.J., Aug. 4, 1986, at 1, col. 3.
7. The 1985 Wyatt Directors and Officers Liability Insurance Survey, quoted in Block,
supra note 3, at 146-47 [hereinafter Wyatt].
8. Cruthcher's Chairman and 3 Directors Quit; Lack of Insurance Cited, Wall St. J., Feb.
12, 1986, at 21, col. 2; Lewin, supra note 5, at Dl, col. 3.
9. FinancialBoards Say It's Harderto Attract Qualified Directors, 162 J. ACCT. 39 (1986).
See Baum, The Job Nobody Wants, Bus. WK., Sept. 8, 1986, at 56; Fowler, Scarce Corporate
Directors, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1986, at D20, col. 1. See also Director Roundtable: The D&O
Crisis and Board Liability, 10 DnRCTORS AND BoARDs, Summer 1986, at 8.
10. Some observers claim that the "boom in liability claims" is the root of the crisis.
Attorneys General Weigh Liability Law, 132 Chicago Daily Law Bull., June 11, 1986, at 1,
col. 5. Others, however, argue that the insurance industry is at fault; still others claim that it
is a combination of the insurance industry and the increase in liability claims which are to
blame. See Insurance Industry, Courts Share Blame for Crisis: Report, 132 Chicago Daily Law
Bull., Apr. 29, 1986, at I, col. 2; Lewin, Insurance a Liabilityfor Some; Costs Rise Prohibitively,
132 Chicago Daily Law Bull., Mar. 26, 1986, at 2, col. 1.
It is the theory of this Note that regardless of the cause of the crisis, the analysis of the
proposals is the same. The ideal response to the crisis should not drastically alter traditional
standards of care, nor should it remove the deterrence imposed by the threat of liability.
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providing protection. Section I examines the problems that might arise if
the D&O insurance crisis were left unchecked. Section II highlights the policy
considerations involved in determining the amount of protection which should
be restored to directors and officers. Although corporate welfare suggests a
need to restore protection, overprotection is counterproductive. Finally, this
Note examines each proposal to determine whether it is effective and whether
it provides a balanced solution to the D&O insurance crisis.
This Note argues that the statutory responses which eliminate directors'
liability for certain conduct are effective in providing protection, but they
are not balanced approaches. These statutes err on the side of overprotection.
The more balanced responses propose to expand indemnity rights or to
establish captive insurance subsidiaries. Proposals focusing on expanded
indemnity and captive insurance will enable a corporation to protect its
directors while not altering the standards to which they are held.
I.

THE D&O INSURANCE CRisis TODAY

The symptoms of the D&O insurance crisis are widespread and well documented." According to the 1985 Wyatt Directors and Officers Liability
Insurance Survey:
18.5 percent of the companies it surveyed for its 1984 Directors and
Officers Liability Survey had experienced claims against their directors,
up from 7.1 percent ten years earlier. [This is] an increase of 182 percent.
At the same time, the average cost of defending these claims had risen
dramatically from $181,500 per claim ten years ago to $461,000 today.
[Moreover,] the percentage of claims paying over $1 million rose from
4.8 to 8.3 percent, and the average settlement award [rose] from $385,000
to $583,000.12
As the number of claims continues to rise and the judgment value of these
claims increases, the degree of protection offered by insurance is simultaneously diminishing. At the same time that insurers are adding policy exclusions, the costs of the D&O policies have skyrocketed. 3 Some insurers
have raised premiums to levels that are fifteen or twenty times higher than
their prior levels, 14 and those insured are subject to higher deductibles. 5
Even corporations willing to pay a higher price for less coverage may have
a problem; such corporations may not be able to obtain insurance because

11. See supra notes 5-9.
12. Block, supra note 3, at 146-47 (quoting 1985 Wyatt Directors and Officers Liability
Insurance Survey).
13. At the same time that prices "have risen astronomically," many "new exclusions have
been developed that seriously restrict coverage." Foley, supra note 6, at 16.
14. Olson, supra note 6, at 25, col. 1.
15. Id.
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many insurers no longer offer D&O coverage, 16Prohibitive costs and general
unavailability, therefore, may preclude many from obtaining D&O insurance.
As a result, the crisis is stripping directors and officers of one of the
protective measures upon which they traditionally have relied.
As indicated by the Wyatt Survey,. the crisis is compounded because the
disarray of the D&O insurance market is coupled with an increasingly litigious
environment. Directors and officers face a greater possibility of being sued
and held liable for significant adverse judgments. 17 In addition, directors
and officers are being held to higher standards of care.' 8 Smith v. Van
Gorkom 9 exemplifies the high liability risks to which directors and officers
may be exposed. In Smith, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the
directors breached their duty of care in approving a cash-out merger proposal.
Although the directors acted in good faith, 20 they were subject to high
personal liability. The insurance company was required to contribute $10
million, the policy limit, and the directors were responsible for the remainder
21
of the $23.5 million settlement.
The directors in Smith, however, were fortunate in comparison to others.
While some corporations are having difficulty finding D&O insurance,2 other
corporations with D&O coverage are finding that their policies may offer
little security. In some instances, D&O policies are "[vulnerable] to early
... cancellation by a nervous insurer .....

21

For example, the news of a

possible hostile takeover of Unocal Corporation prompted Unocal's insurer
to cancel the corporation's D&O policy.Y Without the protection of D&O
insurance, the personal assets of Unocal's directors and officers were exposed
to potential liability.
The ultimate effect of the D&O insurance crisis is that some directors are
resigning from their positions. 25 " 'Being a director is not worth risking all

16. Id.

17. "The uncertainties of indemnification and insurance of corporate officials are likely to
be exacerbated in today's litigious society, where high-stakes lawsuits asserting claims against
corporate officials are increasingly common." Block, Indemnification and Insurance of Corporate Officials, 13 SEc. RE. L.J. 239, 251-52 (1985).
18. Courts are holding directors to higher standards of conduct and are more likely to
impose substantial penalties on directors for failing to meet these standards. Foley, supra note
6, at 17. For an example of the standards to which directors are being held, see Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
19. Id. at 858.
20. Id. Finding no "fraud, bad faith, or self dealing" and applying the business judgment
rule, the court presumed that the directors acted in good faith. Id. at 873.
21. Block, supra note 3, at 136. The company's acquirer, however, relieved the defendants
of the potentially crushing burden of liability by contributing the majority of the remaining
settlement value. Id. at 136 n.28.
22. See Olson, supra note 6, at 25, col. 1;supra text accompanying note 6.
23. Id.
24. Galante, supra note 6, at 1, col. 3.
25. "Just in the last six months, the Control Data Corporation, the Continental Steel
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your holdings,' said Joseph Barr, one of three Control Data Corp. directors
who resigned last December after the company lost its insurance." 26 If left
unchecked, some observers speculate that the crisis could lead to "an exodus
of talented individuals from corporate service .
"..."27
II.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND THE LIMITS THEY IMPOSE
ON D&O PROTECTION

Recognizing the actual and potential danger of the crisis and the important
role directors and officers play in corporate governance, the need for restoring protection is apparent. Providing protection to directors and officers
advances several policy considerations. First, the availability of protection
will reduce the current problem of director and officer resignations by
removing the financial risks of personal liability. When no protection is
available, a director is more likely to resign because she has no insulation
from financial liability. The possibility of being subject to the high costs of
defending lawsuits and to adverse judgments will outweigh the benefits of
a directorship. 2 Second, the availability of protection will serve as a catalyst
to desired corporate behavior by encouraging good faith risk-taking. Although risk-taking invites lawsuits, it may be necessary for corporate success
and profitability. 29 If indemnification and insurance are readily available, a
director or officer will feel freer to take good faith risks. In the event she
is sued for such activity, she is likely to be reimbursed. Alternatively, if no
protection is available a director may avoid all risk in an effort to decrease
the possibility of being sued. 30 Such over-cautiousness is undesirable.
These policy considerations, however, are not without limit. In deciding
the extent to which a director should be insulated from personal liability,

state laws must strike a delicate balance between competing policy interests.
On one side are the policy interests discussed above; a corporation must be

Corporation, the Lear Petroleum Corporation, South Texas Drilling and Exploration Inc. and
Sykes Dataronics have all lost directors when their insurance ended." Lewin, supra note 5, at
DI, col. 3.
26. Marcotte, DirectorateProtectorate,A.B.A. J., Sept. 1, 1986, at 20.
27. Block, supra note 3, at 132.
28. Today, when both the amount and the cost of litigation have skyrocketed, it
would be difficult or impossible to persuade responsible persons to serve as
directors if they were compelled to bear personally the cost of vindicating the
propriety of their conduct in every instance in which it might be challenged.
MODEL BusiNrss CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.44E introductory comment, at 1081 (1980).
29. Some risk-taking is desirable. A corporation that continually makes excessively conservative decisions may diminish its profitability and efficiency. A.L.I. PRINCnILES OF CoR.
GOVRNANCE: ANALYSiS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.17 comment c, at 226 (Tent. Draft No. 6,
1986); M. FEUER, PERSONAL LABmuTI-s OF CoRORaTr OFFICERS AND DIRECTORs 37 (2d ed.
1974).
30. Oesterle, Limits on a Corporation'sProtection of Its Directors and Officers from
PersonalLiability, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 513, 514 (1983).
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able to provide enough protection so that it is able to attract and retain
directors. Furthermore, the protection must be sound enough to encourage
directors and officers to take good faith risks. These concerns must be
balanced against the possibility that if protection is too liberally bestowed,
such measures will defeat an underlying goal of laws imposing liability on
aberrant behavior. This would mean that "faithless" directors would not
be punished.31 Directors or officers should be required to bear the financial
the threat of personal
burden for inappropriate conduct because retaining
32
liability will act as a deterrent to such conduct.
Ideally, the balance of these competing policy considerations should "seek
the middle ground between encouraging fiduciaries to violate their trust, and
discouraging them from serving at all." '3 3 The D&O insurance crisis, however,
has caused the balance to shift, and the result is under-protection. This lack
of protection is chilling directors' willingness to serve in corporate posts.

III.

STATUTORY RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS
A.

Delaware's Approach

The threat posed by the D&O insurance crisis has elicited responses from
varied sources advocating different resolutions to the crisis. In the forefront
are the statutory responses from state legislatures which aim to create an
environment more favorable to directors and officers. Delaware, traditionally
a leader in developing corporate law, enacted a statute3 4 designed to reinstate
the financial protection which D&O insurance once offered. 35 Many states

31. See Johnston, Corporate Indemnification and Liability Insurance for Directors and

Officers, 33 Bus. LAW. 1993 (1978).
32. Note, supra note 2, at 231. According to the Model Business Corporation Act:
A director, officer, or employee who acted wrongfully or in bad faith should not
expect to receive [indemnification] for legal or other expenses and should be
required to satisfy not only any judgment entered against him but also expenses
incurred in connection with the proceeding from his personal assets. Any other
rule would tend to encourage socially undesirable conduct.
MODEL BusINEss CORP. ACT ANN.

§ 8.44E,

at 1082.

33. Johnston, supra note 31, at 1994.
34. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7).
35. According to the synopsis of the bill:

Section 102(b)(7) . .. represent[s] a legislative response to recent changes in the
market for directors' liability insurance. Such insurance has become a relatively
standard condition of employment for directors .

.

.

. The amendments are

intended to allow Delaware corporations to provide substitute protection, in various forms, to their directors and to limit director liability under certain circumstances.
S. 533, 133 Del. Laws 1387 (1986).

19871

RESPONSES TO D&O CRISIS

have followed Delaware's lead and enacted similar statutes. 6 These statutory
responses, however, fall short of being a balanced approach to the crisis.
These statutes are overprotective, and they diminish the deterrence normally

imposed by the threat of liability.
Delaware, in Title 8, section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware Code, allows a
corporation to include in its original certificate of incorporation, or to amend
its charter to include "[a] provision eliminating or limiting the personal
liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary
damages for breach of fiduciary duty . . . -37 Section 102(b)(7) exempts
certain conduct from its protective ambit including breaches of duty of
loyalty, acts or omissions not in good faith, intentional misconduct, knowing
violations of law, and acts for which a director gains improper personal
3 8
benefit.
Under Delaware's new law, shareholders are given the option of deciding
whether to include the provision in their corporation's charter. An existing
corporation may include the provision only if its shareholders vote for its
inclusion. If the shareholders of a corporation do adopt this provision, they
are not completely without a remedy because the amendment does not
preclude shareholders from seeking equitable relief in the form of injunctions
or recision.3 9 In addition, the statute does not extend its coverage to officers.
The narrow application of the law reinforces its purpose of allowing corporations to attract and retain directors. "It was not felt [by the drafters]
that the increased perception of risk of personal liability coupled with the

unavailability of D&O insurance were sufficient to cause officers, who depend
upon a corporation for their livelihood, to resign or refuse to serve." 4
Delaware corporations 4' that adopt amended section 102(b)(7) will succeed
in creating an environment more favorable to directors. The liability-limiting
36. These recently enacted statutes are substantially similar to Delaware's new statute: 1987
Ariz. Legis. Serv. 10-054 (West); COLO. REv. STAT. § 7-3-101.5(2) (1986); GA. CODE ANN. §
14-2-171(3)(A) (Supp. 1987); IoVA CODE ANN. § 496A.A4 (West 1962 & Supp. 1987); Act
effective Feb. 5, 1987, ch. 88, 1987 Kan. Sess. Laws 533 (to be codified at KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-6002); MASS. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 156, § 13 (Law. Co-op. 1979 & Supp. 1987); MICH.
Comp. LAWS ANN. § 450.1209(c) (West 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251 (West 1985 &
Supp. 1987); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78.751 (Michie 1987); N.J. REv. STAT. § 14A:2-7(3)
(1987); N.M. STAT. Am. § 53-12-2(E) (1978 & Supp. 1987); OR. Rav. STAT. § 57.231(3) (1984
& Supp. 1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1410A (Purdon 1967 & Supp. 1987); S.D. CODIEMD
LAvs ANN. § 57.231(3) (1983 & Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-49.1 (1987 & Supp.
1987); Wyo. STAT. § 17-1-202 (1987).
37. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7).
38. Id.
39. See S. 533, supra note 35 (commentary on § 102(b)(7)).
40. Sparks, Delaware'sD&O Liability Law: Other States Should Follow Suit, Legal Times,
Aug. 18, 1986, at 10, col. 1. It is important for a corporation to retain outside directors
(directors who do not hold a position as a corporate officer). They are important to a corporation's independent decision-making process which, in turn, is the threshold for judicial
application of the business judgment rule. Id.
41. About one-half of the Fortune 500 corporations are incorporated in Delaware. Marcotte,
supra note 26, at 20.
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measure allows directors to serve in a relatively risk-free environment despite
an insurance market that offers inadequate coverage. Proponents of the
Delaware law point out that the proposal to eliminate liability for negligence
is not a completely novel idea; it is analogous to trust law standards in
which a trustee can bargain for a contract which excludes him from negligence
liability. 42 An additional benefit of the law is that, in the long run, the law
may make corporations more insurable. With a regime of limited liability,
insurers will be able to base premiums on more reliable 43 and possibly lower
figures. Insurers' exposure to liability claims will decrease as the circumstances under which directors can be held liable decrease. The Delaware law,
therefore, has both corrective and protective aspects; it is corrective because
it helps to stabilize premiums, and it is protective because it shields directors
from liability.
While achieving these advantages, the Delaware law takes corporations
into uncharted territory. The law strips shareholders of their traditional right
to seek monetary damages from directors who breach their duty of care.
The question, however, is whether the cost of this solution is greater than
the benefits. An analysis of how the need to restore director protection
compares with the need to maintain the deterrence imposed by the threat
of personal liability will answer this question.
On the director protection side, the Delaware legislature was generous. By
allowing the elimination of liability, Delaware corporations can place their
directors in a position superior to that held when D&O insurance was the
primary means of protection. Insurance provides a director with insulation
from the financial burden of personal liability, but "[i]nsurance has never
totally protected directors against the risk of monetary liability." 44 Even
with D&O policies, directors may be required to contribute up to the amount
of the policy deductible, which may be a substantial amount.4 5 Directors
similarly are better off because the law eliminates liability for previously
uninsurable conduct. Recklessness, for example, is generally not insurable.
By eliminating liability for recklessness, directors will no longer be required
to bear the risk of liability for this conduct.
Although directors will be better off under Delaware's new law, removing
potential liability will frustrate the two goals-compensation and deterrence-which liability normally advances. 46 As a consequence of Delaware's

42. Victor, Statutory Responses to D&O Crisis Studies, Legal Times, Mar. 31, 1986, at 1,
col. 5. Under trust law, a trustee may contract to relieve himself of liability for negligence.
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TRUSTS § 222 (1959).
43. Delaware Liability Law Warmly Received, Predictions on Impact Remain Cautious, 18
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) at 1309 (Sept. 12, 1986).
44. Wiggins, Delaware's D&O Liability Law: A "Windfall" for Directors, Legal Times,
Aug. 18, 1986, at 11, col. 1.
45. Id.
46. Note, supra note 2, at 231.
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liability-eliminating statute, shareholders will not be compensated for pecuniary losses suffered by the corporation allegedly due to a breach of duty
of care. In addition, the statute diminishes the efficacy of the deterrence
which liability imposes. Normally, the possibility of liability deters directors
from breaching their corporate duties because directors want to avoid the
consequences of personal liability. Under the new Delaware law, the possibility of personal liability for certain conduct is eliminated. This lifting of
the specter of liability decreases deterrence.
In addition, the Delaware provision abolishes the non-pecuniary risks
associated with potential liability. Non-pecuniary risks of liability are a
product of two factors. First, liability may tarnish one's professional reputation. Second, liability may cause the director to lose time due to discovery
or trial proceedings. The time factor "can be crippling to [directors'] other
responsibilities." 47 When the threat of liability is eliminated, a director is
no longer subject to these non-pecuniary risks. This point emphasizes that
under the Delaware law, directors occupy a position superior to that held
when D&O insurance was available. Insurance could never insulate a director
from damage to reputation or loss of time. The elimination of deterrence
under the new Delaware law may result in more frequent occurrences of
48
negligent and bad faith acts.
The liability-eliminating statute will effect laws imposing liability on aberrant director activity by stripping them of their efficacy. A director needs
only to avoid the conduct enumerated in section 102(b)(7) 49 to be exonerated
by a court. The effect of the law, therefore, will be to lower the standards
by which directors will conduct themselves. To illustrate, consider the situation of Delaware directors who are liable for bad faith but not for
negligence.
Directors whose only potential liability is for bad faith need only make
sure that they appear to have honestly believed their conduct was in
shareholders' best interests. But potential liability for negligence encourages directors to monitor the quality of their beliefs because their
good faith may be checked for its objective reasonableness.o
The shareholders of corporations adopting the new Delaware provision
are vulnerable to conduct guided by these lower standards. The statute,
therefore, creates the paradoxical situation of increasing the possibility for
less scrupulous conduct while diminishing the opportunity for adequate re-

47. Lamalie, Tapping the Pipeline of Future Directors, 10 DutCTORS AN BoARDs, Spring
1986, at 22.
48. Wiggins, supra note 44, at 11, col. 1.
49. See itupra text accompanying note 38.
50. Wiggins, supra note 44, at 11, col. 1.
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medial action. 5 Equitable remedies cannot recover pecuniary losses; the losses
that arise will remain with the corporation and the shareholders.
The burdens which the Delaware law imposes on the corporation and the
shareholders demonstrate that it is not the "balanced solution" which its
drafters meant it to be. 2 Section 102(b)(7) does indeed provide protection
to directors. It removes, however, the deterrence of liability laws and simultaneously pays little heed to "the rights and remedies of the legitimately
injured . . . . -53 The Delaware legislature, therefore, offers shareholders a
bleak choice; in order to help a corporation weather the D&O insurance
crisis, shareholders must opt for a provision that tips the scales towards
overprotection. Directors are granted a "windfall," 54 and shareholders must
relinquish their right to sue for monetary damages.
B.

Indiana's Approach

Indiana has responded to the crisis by narrowing the standard of conduct
for which a director may be held liable. 55 Under the Indiana law, a director
is not personally liable unless she breaches her duties and "the breach or
failure to perform constitutes willful misconduct or recklessness." 5 6 The
effect of section 23-1-35-1 of the Indiana Code is to alter the traditional duty
of care. For example, a director may no longer be held liable for gross
negligence because a court must find the director guilty of a higher standard
of culpability. Like Delaware, Indiana has enacted a statute that is not a
balanced response to the crisis.
In many ways, the Indiana and Delaware laws are similar. Like Delaware's
amended section 102(b)(7), Indiana's section 23-1-35-1 is a protective measure
because it may serve to increase the insurability of Indiana corporations.
Liability is restricted to more narrow circumstances, and ultimately, insurers
may decrease premiums to reflect the more restricted potential for liability.
The Indiana statute also creates an environment more favorable to directors
because the statute attempts to limit the situations in which a director can
be held liable. A director previously could be held liable for failing to act
in good faith and "with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like
position would exercise." ' 57 Under the new law, a director of an Indiana

51. A Delaware attorney is skeptical of the effects of a liability-limiting provision. "If you
limit liability, do you make it impossible for shareholders or people injured by actions of
directors to get meaningful redress?" Victor, supra note 42, at 5, col. 1.
52. One of the drafters of the Delaware statute urges other states to follow Delaware's
model. He describes it as a "balanced solution" to the D&O insurance crisis. Sparks, supra
note 40, at 10, col. 1.
53. Foley, supra note 6, at 18.
54. Wiggins, supra note 44, at 11, col. 1.
55. IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1 (1986). This provision automatically took effect in August, 1986.
56. Id. § 23-1-35-1(e)(2).
57. Id. § 23-1-35-1.
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corporation may be held liable only if, in addition to falling below the
traditional standard, the director's conduct constitutes willful misconduct or
recklessness. The Indiana provision, therefore, attempts to instill both corrective and protective measures.
The new Indiana law resembles Delaware's new law in another way.
Although it provides a strong measure of director protection, it sacrifices
competing policy interests. Indiana's statute narrows the standards for director liability, and this undercuts the deterrence of liability laws. "The
potential for negligence liability is a significant and necessary deterrent to
both negligence and bad faith." ' 58 In Indiana, however, a court that is
sympathetic to plaintiffs may be able to circumvent the new law by more
readily finding that questionable director conduct constitutes recklessness.
C.

Proposalsfor Expanded Indemnification Statutes

Other state legislatures have responded to the D&O insurance crisis by
amending their statutes to expand director and officer indemnification rights.
Both Missouri 9 and New York 6° now provide for more liberal indemnification. The expanded indemnification statutes provide protection while maintaining some of the deterrence that the liability-eliminating statutes abolish.
These statutes, therefore, represent a better balance between providing protection and maintaining a check on aberrant behavior.
Missouri, in section 351.355 of the Missouri Code, no longer restricts
indemnification to conduct which is in good faith and reasonably believed
to be in the best interests of the corporation. The new law allows a corporation to include in its original articles of incorporation, or to amend its
bylaws to include a provision allowing indemnity for any conduct so long
as the conduct does not constitute "knowingly fraudulent, deliberately dis' 61
honest or willful misconduct.
The New York legislation similarly provides more extensive indemnification
to those whose conduct does not exceed certain levels of culpability. Section
721 of the New York Code states that the statutory provisions for indemnification are not a corporation's exclusive rights. A corporation may also
indemnify a director or officer for any conduct so long as the director or
officer indemnified is not finally adjudged to have acted in bad faith or
with active and deliberate dishonesty, or in a way through which she gained
advantages to which she was not entitled.6 2

58. Wiggins, supra note 44, at 11, col. 1.

59. Mo. Rav. STAT. § 351.355(7) (1986).
60. N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAW § 721 (McKinney 1986).

§ 351.355(7) (1986).
62. N.Y. Bus. CoRn. LAW § 721 (McKinney 1986).
61. Mo. Ray. STAT.
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By responding to the crisis with indemnity provisions, the New York and
Missouri statutes advance policy interests that their Indiana and Delaware
counterparts diminish. Shareholders of New York or Missouri corporations
retain all rights to sue directors and officers for any breach of corporate
duties. The rights and remedies of shareholders, therefore, remain intact.
Because the shareholder's right to sue is retained in both the New York and
Missouri statutes, these laws preserve a higher degree of deterrence than
either the Indiana or Delaware laws. It is true that both New York and
Missouri allow a corporation to protect its directors and officers from the
financial burdens of personal liability. The desire to avoid pecuniary loss,
however, is not the only aspect of potential liability which deters aberrant
behavior. Deterrence also stems from the possibility of damage to professional reputation that also may result from personal liability.63 Regardless
of the breadth of the New York and Missouri indemnity provisions, neither
statute can insulate a director or officer from the loss which accompanies
a tarnished reputation.
While it is true that these statutes serve the traditional functions of maintaining shareholder remedies and preserving deterrence, these responses to
the crisis do not provide as much protection to directors and officers as the
liability limiting approaches of Indiana and Delaware. First, the New York
and Missouri indemnity statutes are not corrective measures; expanded in4
demnification laws will not help to make corporations more insurable.
These laws instead "shift some of the risk of being uninsured .. . to the
corporation. ' 65 A corporation runs the risk that the insurer will not reimburse
the corporation for payments made according to expanded idemnity provisions. Expanded indemnification rights increase the number of situations in
which an insurer may be subject to claims by the insured. To compensate
for this increased risk, the insurer may raise premiums to a prohibitive level
or alternatively may cancel a D&O policy. Risk, in those cases, would fall
on the corporation or its directors rather than on an independent third party,
66
like an insurer.
A second weakness of the expanded indemnification statutes is that they
are limited in the extent of financial protection that they can provide.
Indemnification is "only as good as the assets of the [director's or officer's]
corporation." 6 7 This means that indemnification provisions offer no help to
a director or officer when the corporation is financially unable to provide
the requested amount of indemnification. This problem could arise if a

63. See supra text accompanying note 47.
64. Block, supra note 3, at 147.
65. Id. at 147-48.
66. Giesen, Can DirectorsPut the Wraps on Personal Risk Exposure?, DIREcTols DIo.,
June 1986, at 10, 12.
67. Olson, supra note 6, at 33, col. 1.
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corporation declares bankruptcy because priority claims might limit the amount
which a corporation could pay as indemnity. In these circumstances, the
68
directors and officers will expose their personal assets to liability.
To mitigate the weaknesses of indemnity statutes and to maximize their
efficiency, corporations adopting expanded indemnity rights should use mandatory language in their articles or bylaws.6 9 The corporation's indemnity
provisions, for instance, should read that the corporation "shall indemnify"
rather than the corporation "may indemnify." ' 70 The latter is an example of
permissive indemnification and only provides the corporation with an option
to indemnify. 7' The former is a mandatory indemnification provision that
gives a director or officer a right to indemnification.72 Assuming a corporation is solvent, its directors or officers will have greater security when the
corporation employs mandatory language because her claim for reimbursement is based on a right rather than a corporate option to indemnify.
D.

Statutes Aimed at the Insurance Industry

Another statutory response to the D&O insurance crisis is directed at the
insurance industry itself. West Virginia recently enacted a reform that places
new limits on insurers' conduct.7 3 One example of the new restrictions is
that the statute mandates that an insurer must give extended advance notice
of its intent to cancel a D&O policy.74 This effort to ease the insurance crisis
backfired, however, when insurers reacted adversely. "Financial institutions
throughout West Virginia recently received notice that their D&O policies
would be cancelled summarily on May 31 in reaction to [the] state-enacted
'T
insurance reform bill [which became effective June 1, 1987].' 7
In an attempt to dissipate the negative reactions to the bill, the legislature
convened in a special session. During that session, the legislature softened
the requirements imposed by the previous bill. 76 The reactions of both the
insurers and the West Virginia legislature demonstrate an important fact:
insurers will not be passive when states enact statutes directly affecting
insurance. Insurers, moreover, possess sufficient political clout to see that
legislatures respond to their outcries against restrictive legislation. 77 This

68. Id.
69. Block, supra note 3, at 139.
70. Id.
71. Oesterle, supra note 30, at 518-19.
72. Id. at 519. Protection is greater if it takes the form of a binding commitment that
provides security against the costs of legal proceedings. Id.
73. Act of March 3, 1986, S. 714, 1986 W. Va. Acts ch. 30, 760-96.
74. See id. An insurer may cancel a policy only if the insured is notified 30 days prior to
cancellation. Id.
75. Giesen, supra note 66, at 12.
76. Act of May 22, 1986, H.R. 149, 1986 W. Va. Acts ch. 17, 1407-17.
77. For a comprehensive listing of insurance reforms and pending reforms, see Illinois
Department of Insurance, Summary of State Actions on Availability (April 1986).
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makes it difficult-if not impossible-for legislatures to respond to the crisis
with direct reforms on the insurance market.

IV.
A.

NON-STATUTORY RESPONSES

Captive Insurance Subsidiaries

In addition to the above-mentioned statutory responses, several non-statutory approaches have been suggested which may help corporations cope
with the D&O insurance crisis. One such alternative is for a corporation to
form a captive insurance subsidiary. This method allows corporations to
form their own source of D&O insurance in order to counteract the consequences of the general unavailability and inadequacy of commercial insurance.78 A corporation desiring captive insurance will act as the parent of
the captive insurance subsidiary, providing a capitalization plan for the
subsidiary. After capitalization, captive insurance companies generally "[are]
professionally managed, and [they charge] premiums to the parent for the
issuance of policies modeled on those in the commercial market. 7 9 By
forming captive insurance companies, corporations create substitutes for the
protection offered by commercial insurers.
The captive insurance alternative, however, may pose several problems to
corporations which will prevent them from enjoying the full range of benefits
supplied by a commercial insurer. For instance, corporations forming captive
insurance subsidiaries will face the same difficulty that commercial insurers
face in "gaug[ing] their potential losses accurately" in the "current litigious
environment." 80 These corporations, therefore, will bear the risks of loss
that would be transferred to a third party if the corporation were commercially insured. In addition, because of the close connection between a parent
corporation and a captive subsidiary, "[c]ourts may disregard the separate
corporate status of the entities."'" Courts may view the arrangement as
merely a scheme to skirt indemnity laws and, consequently, may not allow
captive insurers to make insurance payments to the insured parent corporation.
Another problem frequently encountered by corporations establishing captive insurance companies involves tax disadvantages. The Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) refuses to allow deductions for premiums paid to captive
insurance subsidiaries8 2 even though premiums paid to commercial insurers

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See supra text accompanying notes 5-9.
Olson, supra note 6, at 34, col. 1.
Block, supra note 3, at 146.
Id. at 145.
Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2 C.B. 53, 54.
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are deductible. 83 According to the IRS, premiums are not deductible when
"there is no economic shifting or distributing of risks of loss." ' 84 Under this
theory, premiums paid to insurance subsidiaries are not deductible because
the parent and subsidiary "represent one economic family with the result
that those who bear the ultimate economic burden of loss are the same
persons who suffer the loss." 85
As a result of the IRS' position, the IRS repeatedly has prevailed over
taxpayer corporations claiming deductions for premiums paid to captive
insurance subsidiaries. In Beech Aircraft Corp. v. United States,86 for example, the plaintiff corporation formed an insurance subsidiary to provide
the corporation with products liability insurance. The court held that the
premiums were not deductible because the taxpayer corporation, Beech, failed
to prove a true risk transfer. According to the court, "[the subsidiary] had
a capitalization of not more than $150,000.00. [The subsidiary, however,]
purported to cover a loss of several million dollars excess coverage. [In
reality,] [o]nly Beech could have responded to such a loss had such oc-

curred. "87
In an exception to the IRS' success in these cases, the taxpayer in Crawford
Fitting Co. v. United States 8 prevailed. In that case the IRS characterized
the premium payments as reserves held by the subsidiary to cover the parent's
contingent losses.8 9 The court, however, found evidence of a "distribution
of risk" '9 and allowed the taxpayer to deduct the premiums. Through captive
insurance, therefore, the corporation was successful in obtaining substitute
protection. More importantly, the corporation achieved the same tax advantages as if it had been insured by a commercial insurer because its
premiums were tax deductible.
The foundations of the holding in CrawfordFitting provide some guidance
for corporations planning to set up a captive insurance subsidiary. To increase
the likelihood that a court will find the premiums to be deductible, a
corporation should: (1) maintain separate and independent identities between
the parent and captive insurance company; (2) establish premiums that are
"actuarially based, and proportionate to the risks they [cover];" (3) sell
shares of the captive to third parties so that the "taxpayer is not a shareholder

83. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a) (1985). The Code allows deductions for "ordinary and necessary" expenses. I.R.C. § 162(a).
84. Rev. Rul. 77-316, supra note 82, at 54. For cases holding that risk-shifting is an essential
element of insurance, see Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, 539 (1941); Steere Tank Lines,
Inc. v. United States, 577 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 946 (1979).
85. Rev. Rul. 77-316, supra note 82, at 54.
86. 84-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 85,400, aff'd, 797 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1986).
87. Id. at 85,404.

88. 606 F. Supp. 136 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
89. Id. at 140.
90. Id. at 147.
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of the captive;" and (4) insure "various nonaffiliated persons or entities
facing risks similar but independent of those faced by [the parent]." 9'
A well organized captive subsidiary, therefore, may provide an effective
means of protecting directors and officers. This approach does not sacrifice
any competing policy interests because it mimics the traditional system of
insurance. This alternative, unfortunately, may not be feasible for small
corporations or for corporations that are experiencing financial trouble. Such
corporations may be unable to generate sufficient assets to initially capitalize
a subsidiary.
B. Advisory Boards
A second protective measure which a corporation may use during the D&O
insurance crisis is to substitute its traditional board with an advisory board.
Under this plan, a corporation devises a new board system in an attempt
to eliminate potential liability for board members. Advisory boards are
composed of "former directors who serve without compensation and have
no binding vote on company policy." 92 Under this system, the chief executive
officer bears the responsibility of final decisionmaking 3 and, theoretically,
directors will not be legally accountable for corporate decisions.
In practice, however, advisory boards may be ineffective in protecting
directors and officers from liability. Courts and plaintiffs' lawyers may
disregard the advisory board's special status and impose liability on those
who have guided corporate decisions allegedly leading to corporate losses.
"[A]lmost everyone connected with a corporation is likely to be sued whenever an investor believes he or she has suffered a loss." 94
In addition, placing board members in an advisory status undermines
public policy considerations in several ways. First, if members of the advisory
board are led to believe that they are not legally accountable for their actions,
the incentive to exercise careful business judgment decreases. 95 Second, this
tactic places the chief executive officer in a precarious position. The advisory
board plan provides the chief executive officer with no protection from
liability, and yet it forces him into a position in which he is the "only
accountable person.' '96 The effect of advisory boards could be that the chief
executive officer is "more conservative and [less likely to take risks], and

91.
92.
93.
at 19,
94.
95.
96.

Id. See also Olson, supra note 6, at 25, col. 1.
Galante, supra note 6, at 30, col. 1.
Louden, The Liability of Advisory Boards, 10 DIRECTORS
20.
Galante, supra note 6, at 30, col. 1.
Louden, supra note 93, at 20.
Id.
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thus [he] is harmful to the growth, profitability, and continuance of the
enterprise."97
C.

The Damage Limitation Approach

A third approach is suggested by the American Law Institute (A.L.I.)s
The A.L.I. recommendation retains director and officer liability, but it limits
damages for breaches of duty of care if certain standards are met. 99 Under
this proposal, damages for violations would be "limited to an amount that
is not disproportionate to the compensation received by the director or officer
for serving the corporation during the year of the violation." ' " This limitation on damages would be allowed only if the director or officer's conduct
did not: (1) "involve a knowing and culpable violation of law;" or (2) enable
her to receive an "improper" benefit; or (3) "show a conscious disregard
for the duty of the director or officer to the corporation under circumstances
in which [she] was aware that her conduct created an unjustified risk of
serious injury to the corporation;" or (4) amount to an "abdication of the
defendant's duty to the corporation.' 01
The A.L.I. suggests two possible ways of implementing its plan. The plan
could be effected by legislative enactment of an enabling statute or by
shareholder adoption of a provision in the certificate of incorporation. 0 2
Virginia is the one state that has enacted a statute adhering to the damage
limitation proposal. 03
By limiting liability damages instead of eliminating liability, the damage
limitation proposal maintains some policy interests which liability eliminating
statutes do not.' °4 Provisions eliminating liability for certain conduct may
detract from the credibility of the duty of care standards because directors
and officers are not legally accountable for their conduct. 0 5 The damage
limitation approach, however, maintains the deterrence inherent in potential

97. Id.

98. A.L.I. PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.17
(Tent. Draft No. 7, 1987).
99. See id.§ 7.17(a).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.§ 7.17(b).
103. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1 (1985 & Supp. 1987).
104. Section 7.17 of the A.L.I. PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANcE limits damages instead
of eliminating personal liability. This is an intermediate position which falls between the two
"poles" of "full liability" and "elimination of all liability." A.L.I. PRINCIPLES OF CORP.
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDArOSS § 7.17 comment c, at 30 (Tent. Draft No. 7,
1987). The premise of the A.L.I. approach is that "there should be a minimum boundary in
order that the risk of liability not be so low that the duty of care ...
'fail of its essential
purpose.' " Id. at 31.
105. See id.at 31.
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liability. In addition, this approach allows shareholders to retain their cause
of action for violations of duty of care.
A consideration underlying the damage limitation proposal is fairness to
the directors. "[T]he potential liability in cases where the ceiling could apply
would otherwise be excessive in relation to the nature of the defendant's
culpability and the economic benefits expected from serving the corporation." 1 06
A second consideration underlying the proposal revolves around shareholders' interests. When directors and officers are exposed to potentially
staggering liability, they may become "excessively risk-averse.' ' 0 7 Excessive
conservatism may enable a director or officer to avoid being held liable for
her conduct, but it is not necessarily in the best interests of the corporation. 0 8
Theoretically, damage limitation protects directors and officers while maintaining some degree of deterrence. To be effective, however, several practical
barriers must be overcome. To date, only one legislature has enacted such
a provision. 1 9 For corporations incorporated under any other law, only
corporate amendments or possibly judicial decisions may be used to implement the provision. Neither of these methods, however, provides certain
enforcement. If a corporation adopts an amendment, for instance, it is
possible that a court will overlook the damage limitation provision and
impose a higher liability because this approach lacks precedential value.
"Indeed, no American decision has been discovered which addresses a charter
provision limiting liability for due care violations.""110 Implementation by
judicial decision is similarly a tenuous basis of protection. It offers no
reassurance of financial protection because it depends on each court's receptiveness to this proposal. Therefore, until legislatures indicate their approval of this approach, the damage limitation proposal will not be a reliable
form of protection.
A second problem of this approach involves determining the amount to
which damages should be limited. An idea inherent to the A.L.I. provision
is that the damages limitation will be higher for officers than for directors
because officers are paid more."' The A.L.I. suggests limiting damages to
one year's salary, but this may not be the ideal ceiling. The traditionally

106. Id.
107. Id. at 30. "No evidence suggests that senior executives have been chilled in their
willingness to accept corporate employment or are fleeing the board. Still, concern over liability
may make corporate officers excessively risk-averse." A.L.I. PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AD RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.17 comment g, at 241 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1986).
108. Id.
109. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1 (1985 & Supp. 1987).
110. A.L.I. PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: § 7.17,
at 54 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1987).
Ill. A.L.I. PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.17
comment g, at 241-42 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1986).
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low director salaries" 2 may create ceilings on damages that are so low that
shareholders will have no incentive to sue. Damage awards would not cover
shareholder losses unless that shareholder could also sue officers with higher
salaries and, consequently, higher damage limitations. On the other hand,
expanding the proposed limit of one-year's salary would provide little extra
protection to directors and officers. In short, finding an equilibrium raises
difficult policy questions, and the result may be a sacrifice of either shareholder rights or director protection.
The Virginia legislature decided upon a damage ceiling that limits a director's or officer's liability to either: (1) an amount specified in the articles
of incorporation or bylaws, or (2) the greater of $100,000 or the amount
which the director or officer was compensated in the twelve months preceding
the alleged wrong."' The policy considerations discussed above can be used
to analyze this statute. If a Virginia corporation opts to set the limits through
its articles or bylaws, the corporation faces the difficulty of finding an
equilibrium. If the corporation selects the second alternative, the question
arises whether such a ceiling provides shareholders with adequate remedies.
CONCLUSION

If the effects of the D&O insurance crisis do not dissipate, the crisis could
disrupt corporate governance and diminish corporate profitability. Without
some form of cushion between the directors' or officers' personal assets and
the full impact of personal liability, directors will be unwilling to continue
in their posts, and both directors and officers will be excessively risk-averse.
Recognition of this problem, fortunately, has led to various proposals to
reinstate protection to directors and officers. Some of these proposals, however, are less than ideal solutions from the viewpoint of efficiency and
competing interests.
In examining the desirability of the statutes which have been enacted, it
should be clear that the effects of state laws will remain unless the legislature
repeals or amends the law. While it is not uncommon for legislatures to
repeal or amend laws, this point emphasizes that statutory measures should
be examined for potentially long-term effects. Specifically, statutory responses which sacrifice the long-term interests of corporate welfare are
undesirable.
Scrutinizing the new Delaware and Indiana laws under these guidelines,
it is clear that these statutes do not provide a balanced approach to the
D&O insurance crisis. When directors are no longer legally accountable for

112. See Barker, supra note 1, at 37 (suggesting that if the limitations are so low that even
successful litigation could not possibly recover the alleged loss, litigation would lose its meaning
as a vehicle to recover corporate losses).
113. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1 (1985 & Supp. 1987).
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their decisions, the laws imposing duty of care standards on them become
merely recommended standards. Directors of Delaware and Indiana corporations have the option of complying with these laws, but their actions will
no longer be shaped by the threat of liability which is normally imposed
upon conduct falling below prescribed standards.
The best statutory approach offered to date is represented by the statutes
of New York and West Virginia. Under the expanded indemnity laws which
they have adopted, duty of care standards are still viable forces because
directors and officers are legally accountable for their conduct. Expanded
indemnity rights, moreover, reinstate an outward sign of financial protection.
Corporations adopting these proposals profess financial support to their
directors and officers who are called upon to defend lawsuits. This solution
will encourage directors to serve in their corporate posts and will diminish
the problem of excessive conservatism.
Corporations can easily maximize the efficiency of expanded indemnity
statutes by amending bylaws which employ mandatory indemnification provisions. A corporation creating mandatory indemnification provides its director or officer with a right to indemnity. Mandatory indemnification can
be achieved if corporate bylaws read that the corporation "shall indemnify"
directors and officers for conduct which satisfies the standard deemed to be
indemnifiable. The same result can be achieved by writing an employment
contract for a director or officer which provides that the corporation will
indemnify her if certain standards of conduct are met.
The above methods of indemnification maximization can be used by any
corporation, provided it is within the bounds of conduct deemed indemnifiable by its governing state. Another non-statutory proposal is that a corporation may form a captive insurance company. Such insurance companies
provide a substitute for the protection which was once readily available from
commercial insurers. By utilizing either indemnification maximization or
captive insurance subsidiaries, a corporation can protect its directors and
officers and weather the D&O insurance crisis.
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